Review of Contradiction in Motion: Hegel’s Organic Concept of Life and Value

Hegel famously declares that “Everything in my logic is indebted to Heraclitus” and “Everything is contradictory.” Songsuk Susan Hahn’s study is a thoughtful and unusual treatment of contradiction in Hegel. It illuminates crucial links between the logical, aesthetic and ethical aspects of Hegel’s system, and furthermore is a welcome departure from the prevailing approach to the dialectic as the public-communal constitution and recognition of rational norms, free of ontological claims, in a kind of historicized Kantianism. Hahn observes that Hegel’s concept of life is central to the Science of Logic and to the whole of the system, wherein it has undeniable ontological import. Her book, she tells the reader, began with wonder: “What does Hegel mean when he says we must regard concepts as ‘living’?” (195).

Rest of the review

TOC 

Distributive Justice and Welfarism in Utilitarianism — Jörg Schroth

Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science — Srecko Kovac

Hegel's Account of Rule-Following — David Landy

Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism — Walter Hopp

The Spirit of the Age: Hegel and the Fate of Thinking

(Click here to read the articles)

Table of Contents

The Spirit of The Age and the Fate of Philosophical Thinking — Paul Ashton, Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos
Would Hegel Be A ‘Hegelian’ Today? — H. S. Harris
Hegel, Idealism and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought — Paul Redding
Hegel, Derrida and the Subject — Simon Lumsden
Hegel’s Science of Logic and the “Sociality of Reason” — Jorge Armando Reyes
The Ego as World: Speculative Justification and the Role of the Thinker in Hegel’s Philosophy — Toula Nicolacopoulos, George Vassilacopoulos
Hegel Today: Towards a Tragic Conception of Intercultural Conflicts — Karin G de Boer
Sein und Geist: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Hegel’s Phenomenology — Robert Sixto Sinnerbrink
Hegel, Recognition And Rights: ‘Anerkennung’ As A Gridline Of The Philosophy Of Rights — Jürgen Lawrenz
Hegel’s Theory of Moral Action, its Place in his System and the ‘Highest’ Right of the Subject — David Rose
Being and Implication: On Hegel and the Greeks — Andrew Haas
The Relevance of Hegel’s Logic — John W Burbidge
Agamben, Hegel, and the State of Exception — Wendell Kisner
Gathering and Dispersing: The Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s Philosophy — George Vassilacopoulos
Hegel and the Becoming of Essence — David Gray Carlson
Dialectical Reason and Necessary Conflict—Understanding and the Nature of Terror — Angelica Nuzzo
The Spirit (of our Time) is and is not a Bone. — Johan Vandycke
The Beginning Before the Beginning: Hegel and the Activation of Philosophy — Paul Ashton
Kierkegaard’s Ethical Stage In Hegel’s Logical Categories: Actual Possibility, Reality And Necessity — María J. Binetti
El estadio ético de Kierkegaard en las categorías lógicas de Hegel: posibilidad, realidad y necesidad actuales – María J. Binetti

Kojeve - Introduction to the Reading of Hegel

Spaceman Spiff, over at Cross-X forum, has posted Derrida' Glas.

Link

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND RUDOLF CARNAP: RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGY, LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AND THE ROOTS OF THE CONTINENTAL/ANALYTIC DIVIDE — James Luchte. Philosophy

REPRESENTATION AND POIESIS: THE IMAGINATION IN THE LATER HEIDEGGER — John W M Krummel
           
HEIDEGGER'S ETYMOLOGICAL METHOD: DISCOVERING BEING BY RECOVERING THE RICHNESS OF THE WORD — Matthew King

THOUGHTS IN POTENTIALITY: PROVISIONAL REFLECTIONS ON AGAMBEN'S UNDERSTANDING OF POTENTIALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THEOLOGY AND POLITICS — Alberto Bertozzi.       

A CRITIQUE OF SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S EXISTENTIAL ETHICS — Matthew Braddock

TWO NOTIONS OF OBJECTIFICATION — Iddo Landau.

COMMITTED PERCEPTION: MERLEAU-PONTY, CARROLL, AND IRANIAN CINEMA — Farhang Erfani

ON GIVING HEGEL HIS DUE: THE "END OF HISTORY" AND THE HEGELIAN ROOTS OF POSTMODERN THOUGHT — Jere O'Neill Surber

INNOCENCE, PERVERSION, AND ABU GHRAIB — Kelly Oliver

"OURS IS NOT A TERRIBLE SITUATION" — Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley

A review of Hegel’s Philosophy of Language

Hegel’s views regarding language have provoked a good deal of discussion and often controversy since about the middle of the last century. Among those who have weighed in to one degree or another can be counted such well-known figures as Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Nancy, and Žižek. However, it would be difficult to describe any general contours or results of such discussions for two reasons. First, Hegel himself never provided anything approaching a self-standing ‘philosophy of language’ that could be compared with his philosophies of art, religion, nature, politics, or history. Rather, his views on language are expressed, in part, in several relatively extended discussions which form parts of other philosophical projects and, in part, in quite numerous comments and asides. To complicate matters even more, both longer and briefer reflections occur over the entire course of his philosophical career. Second, prior to the appearance of the present work, there has been (with one exception that I will mention later) no serious attempt to articulate what such a ‘Hegelian philosophy of language’ might look like. As a result, such earlier discussions have something of the quality of dinner gossip about an absent guest, revealing more about the various parties’ own preferences and prejudices than about anything that Hegel himself might have recognized as his own views. Jim Vernon has quite bravely attempted to address this issue head-on. He seeks, in an admirably direct and focused way, to provide a cogent account of language that at once bases itself on some of Hegel’s more important passages on this topic, attempts to remain true to Hegel’s overall philosophical project, and supplies some of the important connective tissue that Hegel himself either omitted or merely glossed.

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Pierre Bourdieu: From Neo-Kantian to Hegelian Critical Social Theory
Author: Redding, Paul
Source: Critical Horizons, Volume 6, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 183-204(22)

Via Cross-X.com

Being Jewish– Emmanuel Levinas

The welcome wound: emerging from the il y a otherwise — Merold Westphal

The neighbor and the infinite: Marion and Levinas on the encounter between self, human other, and God — Christina M. Gschwandtner

The drama of being: Levinas and the history of philosophy — John Caruana

Adorno vs. Levinas: Evaluating points of contention — Nick Smith

Gestures of work: Levinas and Hegel — Silvia Benso

Ethical alterity and asymmetrical reciprocity: A Levinasian reading of Works of Love — Michael R. Paradiso-Michau

Thom Brooks (his blog) has posted his paper entitled “Hegel on the Family” at the new Philosophy Research Network

Abstract:
Perhaps one of the areas of Hegel’s political philosophy that has received the least attention is his theory of the family. This lack of attention is certainly not the result of agreement with his readers. In fact, Hegel’s views have attracted much criticism. This criticism concerns Hegel’s defence of the traditional family: a husband and wife raising children in a monogamous relationship where only the husband engages in activities outside the home, such as employment or full political participation. Such views have brought the ire of feminists, in particular, leading one feminist critic to argue we should all ’spit on Hegel’ as a result(!). Others are equally dismissive, but on different grounds. For example, Peter Steinberger argues that the ‘Hegelian account [of] marriage seems to speak to a simpler time, a time long past’. Thus, it is not so much that Hegel is wrong by our standards, but that he is simply defending the prejudiced view of the family of his day.

I share the view with most, if not all, contemporary philosophers that the ideal family is not a heterosexual, monogamous married couple with children where the wife’s roles are limited to homemaker and mother; I do not believe there is such a thing as ‘an ideal family’. Nonetheless, what I am interested in doing here is merely setting straight Hegel’s arguments in favour of the family and the particular form this family takes. I will argue that the substance of Hegel’s arguments only make sense if we take seriously the rationalist dialectical structure that informs the whole of the Philosophy of Right. The view of the family we find may be familiar, but my account is able to best make sense of Hegel’s arguments and we will be left with a more robust understanding of Hegel’s views on the family that improves upon and corrects previous accounts.